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viewpoint. A broader discussion of what constitutes killing
can be found in Beauchamp and Childress’s classic treatise
Principles of Biomedical Ethics,3 which makes it clear that
the meaning of terms such as killing and letting die is highly
controversial: “The meanings of ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’
are vague and inherently contestable. Attempts to refine
their meanings likely will produce controversy without
closure.”3 Other definitions could lead to a conclusion
that discontinuing a continuous flow ventricular assist device (cfVAD) is less like killing and more like letting die.
Fischkoff and colleagues1 suggest that the presence of
acute severe aortic insufficiency equivalent physiology
(AI-EP) when a cfVAD is disconnected does not render
the act unethical. The critical ethical issue in the case of
cfVAD withdrawal is not the new lethal physiologic
condition of AI-EP, but rather it is the presence of a
voluntary and fully informed request for discontinuation
of an unwanted medical device by a terminally ill patient
with decision-making capacity. In this case, the terminally
ill patient is receiving life support with a cfVAD, so
discontinuing the device is neither physician-assisted
suicide nor voluntary active euthanasia—it is letting
die, equivalent to disconnecting a ventilator from a
ventilator-dependent patient.
Neither Entwistle and Fenton2 nor Fischkoff and
colleagues2 mention an important alternative possibility
for decommissioning a cfVAD, namely, blocking retrograde
flow through the device. Transcutaneous insertion of an
obstructive plug in the conduit4 or ligation of the conduit
through a small thoracotomy incision5 can prevent
backflow, placing the patient in the same clinical situation
he was in before the cfVAD was implanted, thus allowing
him to die as a result of heart failure, as he wishes, without
AI-EP. Obstructing backflow obviates all the ethical issues
Entwistle and Fenton2 raise.
Robert M. Sade, MD
Institute of Human Values in Health Care
Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery
Department of Surgery
Medical University of South Carolina
Charleston, SC
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REPLY: THERE ARE
LIMITS TO AUTONOMY
Reply to the Editor:
We appreciate the concerns of Fischkoff
and colleagues1 regarding the ethics of
withdrawal of left ventricular assist device
(LVAD) support, and we agree with 2
important points they have made: first, that it would be “unethical to force patients to suffer at the end of life without
appropriate palliative care,” and second, that the discontinuation of VAD support is not permissible in all circumstances. We do wish to make a few comments.
We agree with the established consensus that a patient with
capacity can refuse medical therapy at any time. In our manuscript, we have attempted to address the question of how this
can best be applied to a patient with a VAD facing existential
distress and whether there were other ethical issues involved.
The central point of our argument is not that the LVAD creates a new physiology and therefore discontinuation is
wrong. Rather, we argue that it is that it is time to rethink
the limits of autonomy as related to LVAD withdrawal.
We believe that the issue is more complex than just a patient refusing care. This refusal places a duty on the caregiver to disconnect the device, unlike other conditions in
which a patient no longer wants treatment. Further, this is
an action that the patient or family can take themselves,
without invoking the actions of the medical profession.
Finally, the physiology is altered, so that discontinuation
is not returning them to a condition that was present before
the operation. Unlike renal failure, where cessation of dialysis returns them to the same state as before dialysis was
started, discontinuation of LVAD support places them in a
position that is worse than before therapy. One of the key
arguments in the refusal or withdrawal of care is that we
are letting nature take its course. In this case, the natural
physiology has been altered in a way that the acute aortic
insufficiency will be the mode of death, not heart failure.
Fischkoff and colleagues include patients with LVAD
among the terminally ill, but these patients do not meet legal
criteria for terminal illness (life expectancy of less than
6 months, in most states). The data on LVAD clearly show
that heart failure on LVAD therapy is not a terminal disease
or a lethal condition. In the absence of a complication, survival on LVAD support is measured in years, not months.
Until a complication happens, a patient with a LVAD is
no different than any other patient who is at greater than

The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery c July 2020

Authors have nothing to disclose with regard to
commercial support.
average risk for a major negative event. They are stable and
have a good prognosis. If a complication arises, then their
desire to continue on LVAD support can be assessed just
as it is in any other patient with a similar outlook.
Finally, we appreciate the opportunity to re-emphasize the
need for appropriate palliative care for all patients with chronic
illness. We think that we may not have been clear enough about
the end-of-life care of these patients if they decide to disconnect their own device. Although we do not agree that a physician or other health care provider should perform this action, it
is entirely reasonable to have the involvement of palliative care
and/or hospice services to help prevent the anxiety and

discomfort that may arise during discontinuation. We believe
that these actions are an important service that can be offered
to these patients at such a difficult point in time.
John W. C. Entwistle, MD, PhDa
Kathleen N. Fenton, MD, MSb
a
Division of Cardiac Surgery
Department of Surgery
Thomas Jefferson University
Philadelphia, Pa
b
The William Novick Cardiac Alliance
Memphis, Tenn
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